菲律賓申請台灣政府獎學金的人數，在2026年首度突破千人。最終錄取的是147位。這個數字本身沒有太大新聞性——但申請人數創歷史新高這件事，說明的是競爭，而競爭說明的是意圖，意圖說明的是一個正在發生的選擇結構。
同一年，在台就讀的越南留學生突破五萬人。五萬，不是在台協助半導體供應鏈的技術工人，不是觀光客，就是正在唸大學或研究所的學生，用四年或六年的人生跨境落腳在這座島嶼上。
語言不再是門票
更能說明結構轉變的，是馬來西亞的數字。2026年赴台留學的馬來西亞學生當中，非華裔比例達69.3%。台灣政府獎學金的137位馬來西亞得主裡，非華裔佔多數。這個比例在十年前幾乎不可能出現——過去選台灣的馬來西亞人，動機很清楚：說中文、有族裔連結、成本比歐美低。現在不說中文的馬來西亞人也大量來了，「語言」這個解釋框架已經失效。
那來台灣為了什麼？
幾個反覆出現在各類調查與報導裡的答案：學費比日本、韓國、澳洲低；生活費在亞洲主要留學目的地裡屬於可承受範圍；軟實力意義上，台灣的校園環境、醫療可及、整體治安，在東南亞年輕人眼裡有一種可被感知的日常品質。幾萬個分別作出的人生算計，加總起來形成的方向。
日韓在搶，台灣在等
日本與韓國都在積極推動留學生倍增計畫。日本政府過去幾年持續調整獎學金策略，韓國則透過「Study in Korea」相關政策大幅擴招。兩者都有清楚的政策意識：留學生是外交資本的前期投資，是畢業後的勞動力儲備，是二十年後的友好倡議者。
台灣呢？台灣媒體在同一時期討論的，是台積電的先進製程、AI算力出口管制、半導體地緣政治。這些當然重要。但五萬名越南留學生所代表的那條線，幾乎沒有出現在任何主動敘事裡。台灣沒有在說這件事，但事情還是在發生。
軟實力有個特性：不需要被說出來才算存在，但如果一直沒人說出來，就無法被設計、被加強、被有意識地延伸。菲律賓那一千個申請者，其中八百多個沒拿到獎學金，往哪裡去？有沒有人在追蹤？台灣有沒有足夠的學位名額，讓這批人自費入學而不是被擋在門口？
幾萬個人生選擇的加總
有一個角度在這個討論裡常被跳過：留學不是外交，留學是個人決策。一個越南大學生選台灣而不是日本，因為姊姊在台中唸書、學費算得過來、聽說台南食物便宜、覺得台灣不會有太大的語言障礙（反正都要適應）。這個決策路徑和政府的軟實力敘事沒有直接關係，但結果是一樣的——來了，在這裡度過三到六年，帶走的印象會影響未來在越南如何談台灣。
這是為什麼「留學生是軟實力」這句話雖然陳腐，但機制是真的。問題不在承認這件事，問題在台灣有沒有配套的制度意識去接住這批人——畢業之後的居留路徑、就業銜接、校園的非華裔支援服務，這些才是能讓這條線繼續延伸的基礎建設。
五萬人在台灣唸書。五萬份在台灣度過的青春，和台灣的半導體奇蹟一樣真實，只是沒有人替它做季報。
— 施郁雯
Taiwan’s Quiet Pull on Southeast Asia’s Students
Applications for Taiwan’s government scholarships from the Philippines crossed a thousand in 2026 — a record. Only 147 were accepted. The selection number isn’t news. The application surge is. It signals intent, and intent reveals a structural shift in where Southeast Asian students are choosing to go.
In the same year, Vietnamese students enrolled in Taiwan surpassed 50,000. Not seasonal workers, not tourists — full degree students committing three to six years of their lives to this island.
When Language Stops Explaining It
The Malaysian data is the clearest signal of structural change. Among Malaysian students in Taiwan in 2026, non-Chinese-speaking students made up 69.3% of the total. Of the 137 Malaysian recipients of Taiwan government scholarships, non-ethnic-Chinese students were the majority.
A decade ago, this was nearly unthinkable. The dominant explanation for why Malaysians chose Taiwan was always ethnic and linguistic — Chinese heritage, Mandarin fluency, cultural familiarity. That explanation no longer holds. Non-Chinese-speaking Malaysians are arriving in large numbers, which means something else is doing the attracting.
The answers that appear repeatedly across surveys and informal accounts: tuition lower than Japan, Korea, or Australia; living costs within a tolerable range for Southeast Asian families; a daily quality of life — campus environment, accessible healthcare, general safety — that registers as livable rather than aspirational. Tens of thousands of separate calculations arriving at the same answer.
Japan and Korea Are Actively Recruiting. Taiwan Is Just Receiving.
Japan has spent years recalibrating its scholarship strategy to attract Southeast Asian students. Korea has scaled its equivalent programs with explicit targets. Both operate from the same institutional logic: international students are early investments in diplomatic capital, future labor supply, and a generation of people who will speak warmly of the country in twenty years.
Taiwan’s media conversation over the same period has centered on TSMC‘s leading-edge nodes, AI export controls, and semiconductor geopolitics. Legitimate priorities. But the 50,000 Vietnamese students represent a different kind of strategic asset — one that has accumulated largely without being named, designed, or deliberately extended.
Soft power doesn’t require being articulated to exist. But if never articulated, it can’t be reinforced, expanded, or protected from erosion. The 800-plus Filipino applicants who didn’t receive scholarships — where did they go? Does Taiwan have enough self-funded enrollment capacity to absorb them, or did that interest leak to a competitor?
A Sum of Individual Bets
The mechanism worth understanding is that study-abroad decisions are personal, not diplomatic. A Vietnamese student doesn’t choose Taiwan because of a policy white paper. The choice happens because an older sister studies in Taichung, because the tuition math works, because Tainan is cheap, because the language adjustment will happen either way. This decision has no direct connection to government soft-power strategy. The outcome is the same — arrival, years spent here, and the impression carried home shapes how Taiwan gets talked about in Vietnam for decades.
The record Filipino applications, the 50,000 Vietnamese students, the 69.3% non-Chinese-speaking Malaysians — these aren’t separate stories. One story: Southeast Asian young people are increasingly placing their bets on Taiwan, and doing it in growing numbers without Taiwan having to campaign particularly hard for it.
The more useful question isn’t whether this is soft power. It’s whether Taiwan has the institutional infrastructure to receive it — post-graduation residency pathways, employment bridging, non-Chinese-language support services on campuses. That’s the architecture that determines whether this trend compounds or stalls.
50,000 students spending their twenties in Taiwan. As real as the semiconductor miracle. Just nobody’s filing a quarterly report on it.
— 施郁雯
延伸閱讀
https://justfly.idv.tw/s/3w1YJFp